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INTRODUCTION 
William H. Rehnquist’s death in the summer of 2005 ended his long 
tenure as Chief Justice, and has already spurred a significant quantity of 
scholarship assessing his influence on the Supreme Court and the broader 
contours of American law.1  Not surprisingly, this work has focused primar-
ily on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s role within the Supreme Court’s adjudica-
tive function.  In that sphere his imprint on the Court’s decisions was 
crucial but hardly absolute; his views were always tempered by the need to 
forge majorities, and were occasionally insufficiently forceful to prevent 
holdings that contradicted them. 
This Paper assesses a different part of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s leg-
acy.  Among the Chief Justice’s significant statutory and customary powers 
 
*  Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I thank Stephen Burbank, Richard Posner, Ju-
dith Resnik, and participants in a Cornell Law School conference on empirical legal studies for com-
ments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1  For a small fraction of the retrospective scholarship that followed William Rehnquist’s death in 
the summer of 2005, see, for example, Symposium, Looking Backward, Looking Forward:  The Legacy 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1661 (2006); In Memoriam, William 
H. Rehnquist, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 487, 487–502 (2006); Symposium, Just Right?:  Assessing the 
Rehnquist Court’s Parting Words on Criminal Justice, 94 GEO. L.J. 1319, 1319–1634 (2006). 
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over the federal judiciary is the authority to select, from among hundreds of 
judges who sit on lower federal courts, the particular jurists who will staff 
various special tribunals.  Situated outside the Court’s collective decision 
making practice, this power is one much more open to the exercise of the 
Chief Justice’s individual discretion.  One of the courts for which he chose 
the members is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court (“FISA 
Court”),2 the body that hears secret government surveillance requests in 
connection with national security cases.  Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
made twenty-five such appointments to the FISA Court from a pool com-
prised of all sitting federal district judges in the United States. 
The FISA Court’s role in mediating privacy rights and national secu-
rity interests in the war on terror is important and well-known.  Like his 
jurisprudential influence, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s legacy in this area re-
verberates beyond his death, as many of the judges he installed on the FISA 
Court will rule on government surveillance requests for years to come.3  
The FISA Court judges chosen by Rehnquist and his successor John Rob-
erts may become even more influential in the next few years as Congress 
contemplates expanding the Court’s jurisdiction.  This project examines the 
choices he made using several criteria, and concludes that the Rehnquist 
FISA judges were a conservative cohort inclined to favor the government 
on Fourth Amendment issues during their normal judicial work.  However, 
the FISA Court judges he appointed display some diversity in their back-
ground characteristics, and their overall conservatism was not out of step 
with the views held by the majority of judges who populated the inferior 
federal bench during the decades in which he made his selections.  A more 
hegemonic pattern is suggested by Rehnquist’s less numerous choices for 
the FISA appellate panel, which hears the rare government appeal from an 
adverse FISA Court ruling.  The six appellate judges Rehnquist tapped for 
that panel appear to be more uniformly conservative in their judicial phi-
losophy. 
In addition to filling a gap in the assessment of William Rehnquist’s 
judicial career, this Paper is an effort to explore judicial discretion outside 
of the adjudicative context in which it is normally studied.  A basic assump-
tion of much scholarship on law and courts is that both Article III judges 
and the Presidents and Senators who select them seek to advance particular 
judicial policy goals through their official actions.4  To be sure, both judges 
 
2  See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (b), (d) (2000) (giving the Chief Justice the power to designate eleven 
federal district court judges to serve in seven year terms on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
which reviews and decides government applications for electronic surveillance, and three circuit judges 
to sit on an appellate panel). 
3  FISA judges typically sit for seven year terms.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(d). 
4  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2001) (articulating a theory of “partisan entrenchment” whereby winning po-
litical parties seek to “stock the federal judiciary” with ideologically congruent judges who will serve for 
many years as “temporally extended representatives of [those] particular parties”). 
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and politicians are often constrained by a host of external factors—such as 
institutional setting, the interests of other actors, and customary norms of 
official behavior—that preclude single-minded preference maximization in 
either appointments or adjudication.  Nevertheless, the general assumption 
is that within these constraints both kinds of officials seek results as close to 
their preferred policy outcomes as possible. 
The ways in which judges and politicians advance their preferences 
necessarily differ:  the Constitution’s separation of functions, along with 
two centuries of institutional practice, has allocated different roles to the 
two groups.  Politicians appoint, making important threshold choices about 
which persons will occupy lifetime judicial posts.  And judges judge, mani-
festing preferences via the ongoing exercise of adjudicative authority that is 
constrained to varying degrees by textual commands, norms of stare decisis 
and reason-giving, the potential for review by higher courts, and by the dy-
namics of the collective decision-making process on a multimember court. 
This clear separation of functions is muddled by Congress’ occasional 
use of the unusual appointment device studied here.  The unitary appoint-
ment authority that the Chief Justice holds for the FISA Court and other tri-
bunals5 carries with it unusual latitude to shape outcomes by matching 
particular kinds of judges with particular tribunals.  There are a number of 
theoretical objections to Congress’s continued use of this selection mecha-
nism.6  One is that, given the attitudinal heterogeneity of the lower federal 
judiciary, the Chief Justice might use the appointment power to advance 
particular policy ends through the selection of an ideologically uniform 
group of lower court judges.  Moreover, the Chief Justice’s power to select 
special court judges is quite different in kind than the authority that he and 
 
5  The Chief Justice is authorized to select the judges that comprise several important federal tribu-
nals, including:  the FISA Court, see 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (b), (d); the FISA Court of Review; the Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2000) (giving the Chief Justice the power 
to designate five to seven district or circuit court judges to serve on the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation); the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, see 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2000) (giving the Chief Justice 
the power to designate five federal district court judges to serve in five year terms on the Alien Terrorist 
Removal Court, which hears all alien removal proceedings); and, until recently, the Special Division of 
the D.C. Circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 49(a), (d) (1994) (establishing a special “division” of the District of 
Columbia Circuit, comprised of three judges designated by the Chief Justice “for the purpose of appoint-
ing independent counsels”), whose authority to select and empower independent counsels figured 
prominently in Kenneth Starr’s investigation of President Clinton, see, e.g., Steve Daley, Choice of Starr 
Has Partisan Smell, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1994, at 4 (debating the selection of Kenneth Starr due to 
Starr’s Republican affiliation); Michael Kramer, Fade Away, Starr, TIME, Aug. 29, 1994, at 37 (urging 
Starr to quit his new position as Whitewater Independent Counsel); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Learn-
ing the Wrong Lessons From History:  Why There Must be an Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. 
SYMP. J. 1, 10 (2000) (describing the Starr–Sentelle appointments and noting the “great danger” that “a 
conservative Chief Justice . . . is perceived as likely to select conservative judges”). 
6  For more detailed treatment of the history of this appointment device and my objections to it, see 
Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341 
(2004); Theodore W. Ruger, The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1551 (2006). 
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other Article III judges exercise when deciding cases.  The Chief Justice’s 
discretion to pick judges for these tribunals is unconstrained by norms that 
otherwise operate to constrain judicial discretion, such as being required to 
state reasons for his choices, or to work toward a decision collectively with 
the other judges on a multimember court.7 
This Paper undertakes a systematic study of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
appointment choices for the FISA Court, giving particular attention to the 
question of whether the appointment power was used as a means to maxi-
mize his individual ideological preferences.  I have chosen to focus on the 
FISA Court appointments for reasons of both current relevance and meth-
odological opportunity.  The FISA Court’s importance has grown substan-
tially in light of the post-9/11 “war on terror,” as the executive branch has, 
through it, sought and received increasing numbers of surveillance authori-
zations.  But as the vigor of the counterterrorism response increases, so too 
does the need for independent review of executive branch action.8  The 
FISA judges supervise one key intersection between the potentially con-
flicting values of national security and civil liberties, and the manner in 
which the judges mediate this boundary has important implications for 
other debates related to counterterrorism policy. 
The similarity between the balancing of enforcement interests and pri-
vacy interests that is critical to FISA Court judging, and the balancing cen-
tral to ordinary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, provides a 
methodological opportunity for assessing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s ap-
pointment choices.  The statutory standard that FISA requires for surveil-
lance authorizations is not precisely the same as the normal Fourth 
Amendment warrant standard.9  But the balancing of national security con-
cerns against civil liberties that FISA judging entails is sufficiently analo-
gous to “regular” Fourth Amendment judging to justify screening the FISA 
judges’ pre-appointment Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for clues about 
their ideological leanings.  So, as described in detail below, one facet of this 
study entailed the review and coding of hundreds of available Fourth 
Amendment rulings to assess, both individually and collectively, the re-
vealed attitudes of the judges whom Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed to 
the FISA Court.  For those twenty-five judges I also assessed two more 
 
7  For a deeper exploration of the normative incongruity of the Chief’s special authority in this area, 
see Ruger, The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power, supra note 6, at 
1554–67. 
8  The Supreme Court recently reiterated that a war on terror is not a “blank check” to violate consti-
tutional protections.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (emphasizing due process rights of 
citizens detained in the war on terror and declaring that “a state of war is not a blank check for the Presi-
dent when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens”); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–85 
(2004) (holding that United States courts have jurisdiction to consider the legality of detention of foreign 
nationals captured abroad and held at Guantanamo Bay). 
9  For a more specific discussion of the FISA standards, see infra notes 12–17 and accompanying 
text. 
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general proxies for judicial ideology:  the party of appointing president, a 
simplistic binary measure of a nominee’s ideology; and a more nuanced 
ideology measure derived from the ideological preferences of the Senators 
who were important in the judges’ original nominations.  I also collected a 
variety of more specific biographical information, including data on 
whether the FISA judges had prior military service. 
What emerges from this first level of data collection and analysis is a 
picture of twenty-five Rehnquist-selected judges who are primarily Repub-
lican appointees, who skew in a conservative direction based on the nomi-
nate-score analysis, who ruled in the government’s favor in a large majority 
of the Fourth Amendment questions presented to them, and who are pre-
dominately military veterans.10  This is an interesting collective portrait, and 
might explain the FISA Court’s unusually high pro-government ruling rate.  
Yet, it lacks context.  A more meaningful assessment of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s appointment choices must establish a comparative baseline 
against which to measure his selections. 
Accordingly, in the second phase of this project, I selected a random 
set of judges from the same pool from which the Chief Justice picked his 
FISA Court judges, and then collected a data set parallel to that detailed 
above for the FISA judges, for the random group.  The initial comparison 
suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s FISA Court selections do not differ 
significantly, on the relevant ideology measures, from the random group.  
In other words, the Rehnquist FISA Court judges may be conservative both 
in general, and on Fourth Amendment issues in particular, but this conser-
vatism appears to reflect the baseline of the federal judiciary rather than an 
unrepresentative cohort chosen by the Chief Justice. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE FISA COURT AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S 
APPOINTMENT POWERS 
Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA)11 during an earlier era of public debate over the proper balance be-
tween national security enforcement (then related to the Cold War) and civil 
liberties protection.12  The FISA contains a substantive standard for surveil-
lance authorization that is analogous to, although dramatically less stringent 
than, the basic Fourth Amendment warrant standard.13  For an authorization 
 
10  The full list of the FISA Court judges is contained in the Appendix, below. 
11  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518–2519 (2000)). 
12  STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., REPORT ON COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963–1973 (Comm. 
Print 1975), available at http://www.foia.state.gov/reports/churchreport.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). 
13  The Ninth Circuit found that FISA creates a lower standard of probable cause, but justified such a 
lenient government burden because the surveillance was for security rather than law enforcement pur-
poses.  See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kennedy, J.).  The Second 
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warrant to issue under FISA, the government must show that “there is prob-
able cause to believe” that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a for-
eign power or an agent of a foreign power” and that “each of the facilities 
or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is 
about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”14  The 
ordinary Fourth Amendment standard, by contrast, requires that warrants 
issue only on a showing of probable cause to believe that an actual crime 
has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be found in the 
place to be searched.15  Unlike the strictures that the Fourth Amendment and 
the federal wiretapping statute impose on ordinary law enforcement surveil-
lance, FISA’s “probable cause” standard does not require any additional 
showing of likelihood of criminal activity—probability of acting on behalf 
of a foreign power is sufficient.16  FISA also requires the government to 
demonstrate that it is following appropriate procedures, a requirement de-
signed to minimize any collateral threats to the civil liberties of persons in 
the United States.17 
To enforce this specialized probable cause standard, FISA created a 
new federal district court of limited but exclusive jurisdiction.  In 2002, 
Congress expanded the FISA Court from seven to eleven district judges, all 
of whom serve staggered, non-renewable terms of no more than seven 
years.18  Service on the FISA Court is a part-time position.  The judges ro-
tate through the court periodically and maintain regular district court 
caseloads in their home courts.  The Chief Justice is empowered to select 
the FISA Court judges from among all existing federal district court judges, 
including senior judges.19  In accordance with its role in sensitive national 
security matters, FISA Court hearings are cloaked in specialized procedure:  
hearings are ex parte, with only Department of Justice attorneys appearing 
before the judge on duty; they are housed in a special secure chamber 
within the Department of Justice; and the transcripts are unavailable to the 
public.20  If the FISA Court denies a warrant application, the government 
can appeal to a special FISA Court of Review that is comprised of three 
                                                                                                                           
Circuit also upheld FISA’s constitutionality.  See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 71–76 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
14  50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000). 
15  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 355 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
16  For a comparison of the warrant requirements of FISA with those of the ordinary federal wiretap-
ping statute (Title III), see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 737–42 (Foreign Int. Sur. Ct. Rev. 2002). 
17  See id. 
18  See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208 (2001) (amended and codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (d) (2000)). 
19  50 U.S.C. § 1803(a). 
20  See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (c) (2000) (discussing security measures for the proceedings); see also 
Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears:  The Background and First Ten Years of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 812 (stating that “[t]he gov-
ernment presents applications for warrants to the FISC judges in in camera, ex parte proceedings con-
ducted under physical security measures designed to protect sensitive national security information”).  
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federal circuit judges.  The judges on this specialized appeals court are also 
selected by the Chief Justice.21 
Although facts about individual FISA warrant authorizations are not 
public, the Department of Justice does issue annual reports summarizing 
and aggregating its FISA Court activities.  What emerges from this data is a 
government success rate unparalleled in any other American court.  In the 
first twenty years of the Court’s existence—from 1978 to 1999—the FISA 
Court granted almost 12,000 surveillance warrants and denied none.22  Only 
once in recent years has the Court ruled against the government on a FISA 
warrant request, and even that denial was swiftly reversed on the merits by 
the FISA Court of Review.23  Because only the government can appeal an 
adverse decision below, this was the first time the Court of Review had ever 
convened.  This lopsided decisional history, coupled with the secret and un-
reported nature of most of the FISA Court’s work, precludes individualized 
analysis of the FISA Court judges based on their decisions on that court.  
But the dramatic skew also raises one of this study’s research questions:  Is 
it possible to discern a similar (if less dramatic) pro-government bias in the 
Fourth Amendment questions the FISA judges resolved on their home 
courts prior to appointment?  If so, this observable skew could have pro-
vided the Chief Justice with a window into their ideological preferences, al-
lowing him to make FISA Court appointment selections on that basis. 
II. METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES 
A. General Motivation, Choices, and Challenges 
Many objections to the Chief Justice’s appointment power apply re-
gardless of whether there is evidence of strategic appointment behavior by a 
particular Chief Justice for a particular court.  But the critiques could gain 
greater traction to the extent there were hard evidence of policy-motivated 
appointment behavior.  Over seventeen years, William Rehnquist appointed 
twenty-five federal district judges to serve fixed terms on the FISA Court.  
This project aims to assess whether there is evidence that Rehnquist chose 
judges who are (or appear to be) ideologically inclined to support the gov-
ernment’s requests for FISA surveillance warrants.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
was perceived to be a conservative (pro-government) jurist when he ad-
 
21  See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b). 
22  See Lawrence D. Sloan, ECHELON and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence:  A Need for 
Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1467, 1496 (2001) (no denials in 11,883 surveillance warrant requests); see 
also Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 815 (“[I]n over four thousand matters involving electronic surveil-
lance [as of 1987] using various techniques directed at various types of targets in various circumstances, 
the [FISA Court] saw fit to deny no government request.”). 
23  See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (Foreign Int. Sur. Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that surveil-
lance of an agent does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as foreign intelligence is the signifi-
cant purpose of that surveillance). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 246 
dressed Fourth Amendment issues that came before the Supreme Court.24  
My hypothesis was thus that, to the extent his appointments evidenced any 
meaningful attitudinal skew, it would be in favor of judges likely to support 
government authority to conduct surveillance. 
Because this study focuses primarily on federal district judges, it faces 
the general challenges that confront all attempts to empirically assess the at-
titudes of that cohort.  Several factors combine to make it more difficult to 
assess the ideology of district judges than those at higher levels of the fed-
eral judiciary.  First, district judges typically decide cases individually, pre-
cluding use of methodological techniques common in analyses of decisions 
made by multi-member court.  Attitudinal research on the Supreme Court 
has achieved a high level of sophistication in significant part because the 
Court is a closed set of nine judges, making it susceptible to a variety of 
linear scaling techniques that can draw upon hundreds of decided cases to 
model and assess the ideology of the Justices relative to each other.25  The 
rotating panel systems of the federal appellate courts frustrate the applica-
tion of a single linear attitudinal model, but do afford some basis for com-
parison among different judges with the same case stimuli.26  No such 
group-based comparative measures exist for ordinary district court judging. 
Second, although more specific analysis and coding of individual dis-
trict judge ideology is possible, the size of the federal district bench (over 
800 judges at this writing) means that there are few resource studies from 
which to borrow pre-determined ideology scores for district judges gener-
ally or for the Rehnquist FISA judges specifically.27 
Even a careful coding of individual district judges’ available decisions 
may be an imperfect window into judicial attitudes for two additional rea-
sons.  First, the institutional placement of district judges at the bottom of the 
Article III hierarchy means that their decisions are more certain to be re-
viewed by other judges; their decisions are more likely to reflect percep-
 
24  See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2353–2416 (de-
scribing William H. Rehnquist’s role in producing a more conservative criminal procedure both before 
and after he joined the Supreme Court). 
25  See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL (1993); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); Jeffrey A. 
Segal, Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabalistically:  The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962–81, 78 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 891, 892–93 (1984).  The rotating panel systems of the federal appellate courts frustrate 
the application of a single linear attitudinal model, but do afford some basis for comparison among dif-
ferent judges with the same case stimuli, as do instances when appellate judges sit en banc. 
26  For a comprehensive discussion of the methodological challenges and opportunities facing schol-
ars of federal appellate courts, see Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking 
on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1665–69 (1998). 
27  A notable exception is the prolific work on the federal district judiciary by Robert Carp and C.K. 
Rowland.  See ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS (1983); C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS (1996). 
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tions of prevailing circuit court or Supreme Court precedent, and less likely 
to reflect their own ideological preferences than are the decisions of higher 
courts, whose judges have greater attitudinal discretion.28  This clearly dif-
ferentiates district court judges from Supreme Court Justices, but also from 
their circuit court counterparts, whose decisions are unlikely to be reviewed 
given the Supreme Court’s parsimonious use of its discretionary jurisdic-
tion.  Second, only a small fraction of district judges’ rulings are reduced to 
writing, and an even smaller fraction are available electronically.29  For 
these reasons, any wide-ranging study of district court preferences that re-
lies on written decisions draws on an incomplete set of judicial actions. 
Taken together, these limitations complicate the study of district judge 
behavior in a way that is particularly relevant to this study.  Because district 
judges do not sit together, because their decisions are promulgated un-
evenly, and because they reside in different circuits with different govern-
ing law, it is more difficult to make comparisons between two district 
judges, or groups of district judges, than it is to compare Supreme Court 
justices or circuit judges.  The precise research question here—whether 
Chief Justice Rehnquist has appointed certain kinds of district judges to the 
FISA court—compels just that sort of comparative analysis.  A crucial 
question is not simply whether the Rehnquist appointments are “conserva-
tive” in some abstract sense (although they appear to be), but whether his 
FISA selections are dramatically out of line with the baseline preferences of 
the district court judiciary. 
B. Specific Methodological Choices 
The research agenda for this project, then, is a compound one:  first, to 
assess the twenty-five actual Rehnquist choices using a number of different 
ideology measures; and second, to develop those same measures for a group 
of randomly-chosen judges to arrive at a comparison point.  This subsection 
first describes the assessment mechanisms, detailing the steps taken to alle-
viate the difficulties associated with studying district court judges, and then 
details the methods used to randomly select the control group of judges. 
1. Assessing the FISA Judges.—Despite the difficulties inherent in 
performing attitudinal research on district judges, a few readily ascertain-
able general proxies for judges’ likely policy preferences have achieved 
some currency in the literature.  In this study I used two of these established 
proxies, and a third proxy of my own creation based on the judges’ Fourth 
Amendment rulings.  First, like many studies before, this work uses the 
 
28  See Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Procedure in the 
Federal Judiciary:  A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143 (2003). 
29  On the low publication rate of district court opinions in a different area of the law, see Peter 
Seigelman and John J. Donohue, Studying the Iceberg From Its Tip:  A Comparison of Published and 
Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 1133 (1990). 
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party of the appointing President as a crude proxy for the ideology of the 
FISA judges and the random group.  The overly simplistic nature of this bi-
nary variable is illustrated anecdotally by the judicial careers of Justices 
John Paul Stevens and Harry Blackmun (Republican appointees but liberal 
jurists) and Byron White (Democrat appointee but relatively conservative 
jurist).  Nonetheless, the party of the appointing President remains a widely 
recognized metric for assessing a court’s ideological composition, and over 
a sufficient number of judges, studies show that the appointing President’s 
party generally correlates with subsequent judicial behavior.30 
A few judicial scholars have begun using a second easy-to-obtain ide-
ology proxy that is more nuanced, and thus may correlate even more closely 
with judges’ subsequent behavior.  This new assessment technique builds 
on advances in measuring the ideology of members of Congress made by 
scholars of that institution, most notably Keith Poole and Howard Rosen-
thal.  These scholars have developed sophisticated ideology measures for all 
members of Congress dating back many decades.31  Under this method of 
assessing Congressional ideology, scholars have coded every recorded vote 
on a linear liberal-conservative scale.  The “coded” votes are then used to 
generate overall ideology scores for each member of Congress.  These ide-
ology scores, called “nominate scores,” are expressed as a number between 
1, the most conservative nominate score, and –1, the most liberal score.  
Nominate scores close to zero indicate a relatively moderate voting record. 
With these Congressional scores well-established in the political sci-
ence literature, some scholars of the judiciary have used the measurement as 
a rough proxy for the ideology of federal judges.  By matching each federal 
judge with the numerical scores of his or her likely Senatorial sponsors, 
these scholars recognize the crucial role home-state Senators play in the ju-
dicial selection process.  Senators—particularly those of the President’s 
party—have traditionally had significant influence in the selection and ap-
proval of nominees to the federal district courts in their home states.32  
Thus, a particular Senator’s score—or the mean of two Senators’ scores, 
where both of a state’s Senators belong to the President’s party—can be as-
signed to the judges in whose nominations she participated.  This scoring 
 
30  For a comprehensive collection of eighty-four studies measuring party and judicial ideology, see 
Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts:  A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. 
SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999) (concluding that “[c]umulating and synthesizing empirical findings . . . confirm 
conventional wisdom that party is a dependable measure of ideology in modern American courts” and 
that “Democratic judges indeed are more liberal on the bench than Republican counterparts”). 
31  See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS:  A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales, 42 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 954 (1998).  Poole and Rosenthal provide a full list of their scores for current and past 
Presidents and members of Congress on a website:  http://voteview.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2006). 
32  See Brannon P. Denning, The “Blue Slip”:  Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation 
Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001); David Law, Appointing Federal Judges:  The Presi-
dent, the Senate, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 493–94 (2005). 
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technique has the potential to better capture the nuance of intra-party ideo-
logical variation than a crude focus on the appointing President alone.  For 
instance, a Maine district judge nominated by President Bush but sponsored 
by Olympia Snowe (a moderate Republican with a nominate score of 
0.059), would receive a very different score than a Mississippi judge who 
was put forward by Trent Lott (a more conservative Republican with a 
nominate score of 0.492).33 
Applying a version of this method in comparison with other ideology 
proxies, Michael Giles, Virginia Hettinger and Todd Peppers found that 
when one or more of a nominee’s home-state Senators was of the Presi-
dent’s party, the President’s own ideology did not accurately predict the be-
havior of the judges he appointed.34  The hypothesis that these authors 
employed, and that I adopt here, is that the Senatorial nominate scores may 
more accurately reflect the judicial nominee’s ideology than a blunt focus 
on the President alone, even though the Senators and nominated judges are 
not precisely congruent.35  In coding the nominate scores for both the FISA 
Court judges and the random control group, I used the specific methods 
used by Giles, Hettinger and Peppers.  Where two home state Senators of 
the President’s party were serving at the time of appointment, judges were 
assigned the mean of the two; where only one Senator was of the Presi-
dent’s party, I used that Senator’s score only; and where neither home state 
Senator was of the President’s party, I used the nominate score of the Presi-
dent alone. 
Although nominate scoring provides a more nuanced variable than a 
binary party-based measure, both are general proxies that predict judicial 
behavior imperfectly, without regard to particular judicial views on specific 
doctrinal subject areas.  Because the FISA Court’s jurisdictional scope is 
quite narrow—limited to approval or disapproval of national security sur-
veillance requests—I sought a measure of the FISA judges’ attitudinal pref-
erences that was a more precise substantive fit with their role on that court.36  
Since FISA calls for the judges to apply a balancing test that is related to 
ordinary Fourth Amendment probable cause standards,37 judges’ decisions 
in the latter class of cases can provide a predictive proxy for judicial behav-
ior once on the FISA Court.  Relatedly, the Chief Justice himself might re-
 
33  The nominate scores used here were the DW-nominate scores available on the Poole-Rosenthal 
website, see supra note 31, for individual Senators during the relevant years of nomination. 
34  See Micheal Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges:  A Note on 
Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 635 (2001). 
35  See id. 
36  As noted earlier, the actual FISA rulings are of little use for this assessment purpose, both be-
cause of the secret nature of much of the court’s work, and because the government’s overwhelming 
“win” rate (over 99.9%) at the FISA Court precludes meaningful assessment of the FISA Court judges 
based on their work on that court.  See supra notes 20, 22. 
37  See discussion supra p. 242. 
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gard district judges’ views on “regular” Fourth Amendment questions as a 
relevant signaling factor in selecting judges for FISA service. 
To measure this more targeted variable for both the Rehnquist FISA 
judges and a randomly-selected control group of federal judges, I assessed 
revealed behavior on Fourth Amendment issues in criminal cases for all of 
the judges in both groups.  This entailed the coding of a large number of ju-
dicial decisions, and presented a number of ex ante methodological dilem-
mas:  where to look for cases, which cases to include as data, and how to 
code the cases.  In addressing these questions I made a number of choices 
that, though defensible, are by no means unassailable and so merit further 
discussion. 
First, I assessed only the Fourth Amendment decisions that were avail-
able in Westlaw’s electronic district court and circuit court databases.  As 
many have noted, such a limitation ignores a significant portion of the work 
of the federal courts.  Moreover, publication of a district court opinion en-
tails two volitional acts:  one by the district court judge, who decides to 
send the opinion to West Publishing; and one by West editors to include the 
opinion in the Federal Supplement.  Both of these decisions can skew the 
nature of the electronically available subset of cases.38  To a certain extent 
the latter discretionary choice (to officially “publish” a case) is less impor-
tant than the initial judicial decision to send it in, since West now includes 
“published” and “unpublished” decisions in searchable form in its district 
and circuit court databases.  My dataset included numerous electronically 
available decisions that are unpublished in the formal sense. 
I focused on this electronically available universe of cases despite 
these valid objections for several pragmatic and conceptual reasons.  This 
project involves behavioral assessment of a large number of judges (fifty).  
Within the Westlaw databases alone, research into the Fourth Amendment 
decisions of these fifty judges yielded over 1,000 cases for review.  I se-
lected and coded several hundred of these for use in the project. 
I limited my research to electronically available cases for two prag-
matic reasons.  First, the judges to be studied were spread throughout doz-
ens of different judicial districts; this precluded in-depth focus on the paper 
records of a single district court.  Second, the nature of Fourth Amendment 
rulings in actual cases made electronic text searching an essential tool for 
finding the greatest number of rulings.  Fourth Amendment decisions—
typically embodied in a grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence—
do not manifest as individualized “cases” themselves, but are usually em-
bedded within ordinary criminal cases.  Many of the decisions coded and 
utilized herein were interlocutory orders that would have evaded review if 
 
38  See Deborah Jones Merritt & James Brudney, Stalking Secret Law:  What Predicts Publication in 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001); Seigelman & Donohue, supra note 
29; Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decision-
making: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 534–36 (2004). 
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the search were limited to reviewing final case resolutions.39  Locating these 
Fourth Amendment decisions within the larger case contexts required use of 
a database that permitted specific textual searching.  Moreover, this search 
tool made it possible to identify Fourth Amendment decisions rendered at 
the district court level via review of circuit court decisions, as district court 
rulings could be discovered by locating circuit court references to them.40 
In addition to these pragmatic reasons for limiting my search to these 
electronic sources, there is a conceptual justification that alleviates the usual 
incompleteness concern that might attend an empirical project of this type.  
The primary focus of this study is the appointment behavior of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in filling the FISA Court seats, rather than a first-order inquiry 
into the precise Fourth Amendment views of the particular judges he chose.  
The fact that publication of a district court opinion is a public and volitional 
representation of a judge’s Fourth Amendment views hardly makes that 
subset of cases irrelevant to assessing the Chief Justice’s appointment 
choices.  In fact, it may increase the relevancy of that more prominent set of 
cases.  In other words, if all federal judges were de facto identical in their 
Fourth Amendment attitudes, but a certain group was more visibly pro-
government as measured by the opinions they sent for publication, a finding 
that the Chief Justice chose judges predominantly from the high-profile 
Fourth Amendment group would say something important about his own 
appointment criteria and the signals that were relevant to him.  This is not to 
claim that the Chief Justice relies exclusively, or even primarily, on pub-
lished judicial opinions in selecting his FISA Court judges.  However, a 
judge’s behavior as revealed in published opinions is relatively more likely 
to influence the Chief Justice’s perception of a lower court judge’s attitudes 
than judicial behavior that is not reduced to a published opinion. 
In identifying and coding decisions within the two Westlaw databases, 
I made two other substantive choices.  The first was to focus only on core 
Fourth Amendment rulings in the context of criminal cases.  Every judge 
studied here had issued at least several opinions in Section 1983 civil cases 
involving asserted deprivations of Fourth Amendment protections.  After 
some trial and error in initial review of several dozen cases, I made a judg-
ment that such civil liability cases were too often compounded by official 
immunity issues to reliably reflect a judge’s outlook on the Fourth Amend-
ment, and even where they were not, they reflected a different kind of atti-
tudinal tradeoff:  they looked at the question ex post, for purposes of 
awarding monetary damages, rather than from the ex ante perspective that 
 
39  This would also make even full paper docket searching incomplete absent line-by-line review of 
transcripts of proceedings, since some motions to suppress are ruled on orally from the bench. 
40  A possible caveat to this use of circuit court decisions is as follows:  Although most circuit court 
decisions, whether technically “published” or not, are included in Westlaw’s electronic databases, focus 
on this set of cases is incomplete given the discretionary role of the losing party below in pressing an 
appeal. 
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provides a suitable proxy for the FISA Court’s balancing of national secu-
rity concerns with civil liberties.  Similarly, I excluded most opinions in-
volving prisoners’ claims for post-conviction relief (habeas corpus or 
Section 225541), unless it was clear that the judicial ruling on the Fourth 
Amendment issue was untainted by the differential standards of review 
normally applicable in such cases.  Finally, I coded the relevant Fourth 
Amendment cases in blunt binary fashion, as either pro-government or pro-
defendant, thereby ignoring significant doctrinal and factual nuance in order 
to capture a more general attitudinal measure across a large number of 
cases. 
2. The Random Control Group.—One other fundamental aspect of 
the study design was construction of the random group of federal district 
judges that would provide the ideological baseline by which to assess Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s FISA choices.  Because he made his twenty-five ap-
pointments incrementally over a period of 17 years, during which the com-
position of the lower federal judiciary changed, I did not select the random 
judges from a single point in time.  Rather, I used three separate historical 
pools of district judges from five year intervals (1992, 1997, and 2002), and 
drew from those different pools to build a random FISA Court of twenty-
five judges, the same number actually appointed by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.  Given Congressional expansion of the FISA Court in 2002, I 
selected more judges from the 2002 pool than the prior two pools to corre-
spond with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s more frequent selections toward the 
end of his career.42  Once the twenty-five random judges were selected, I 
applied the same assessment techniques discussed above to each judge in 
that group. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The primary aim of this study was to assess whether the ideological 
profile of the judges Chief Justice Rehnquist chose for the FISA Court dif-
fered significantly from that of the background federal district court judici-
ary from which he made those appointments.  The findings here show that 
the Rehnquist judges were not meaningfully different from the pool from 
which they were selected.  In other words, the Rehnquist judges scored con-
servatively on the ideology measures used, and were overwhelmingly pro-
government in Fourth Amendment cases, but not significantly more so than 
a group picked at random.  Even the striking proportion of military veterans 
 
41  28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2004). 
42  I selected nine judges from the 2002 pool, and eight judges from each of the 1992 and 1997 
pools.  The actual selection of random judges entailed assigning a number to all eligible federal district 
judges (active and senior), and then using a random number generator program to select certain judges 
numerically.  I included senior judges in the selection pool both because they are statutorily eligible for 
appointment, and because Chief Justice Rehnquist has in practice occasionally selected senior district 
judges for his FISA appointments. 
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on the FISA Court43 was reproduced in the group of twenty-five judges on 
the random court.  These findings could be solidified by constructing and 
evaluating a larger random sampling of judges. 
A. The General Ideology Proxies 
The congruence between the Rehnquist choices and the judges in the 
random group is most evident in the two general ideology scores I meas-
ured:  party of appointing President and nominate score.  As Table 1 illus-
trates, the proportion of Republican-appointed judges in both the FISA 
group and the random group was almost the same, varying by only one 
judge.  Measured by the nominate scoring technique, the FISA judges were 
marginally less conservative than the random group of twenty-five.  
 
Table 1:  President’s Party and Nominate Score Analysis. 
 Republican Appointees Average Nominate Score 
(+1 = cons.; –1 = lib.) 
FISA Judges (n=25) 16  (64%) 0.055696 
Random Judges (n=25) 15  (60%) 0.116783 
 
The proportion of Republican-appointed judges in the two groups was 
not out of line with the federal judiciary at large during the relevant time pe-
riods.  In 1988, the percentage of Republican appointees in the lower fed-
eral courts was 61.2%.  By 1992 it was 72.2%.44  By 2000, after a steady 
decline during the Clinton presidency, Republican appointees were ap-
proximately equally distributed with Democrat appointees.45  Given this tilt 
in the federal judiciary during most of the studied period, it is unsurprising 
that the random court reflected a significant majority of Republican ap-
pointees, as did Chief Justice Rehnquist’s choices. 
What is more interesting about the specific appointments Chief Justice 
Rehnquist made is this:  his willingness to select Democrat-appointed 
judges for the FISA Court increased dramatically in the last six years of his 
career.  Of the first twelve FISA appointments the Chief Justice made, ten 
 
43  Sixteen of the twenty-five Rehnquist-appointed FISA Court judges had served in the military.  
Although I did not start the project looking at this variable, when I noticed this feature in the biographies 
of many of the actual appointees, I decided to systematically check for it in both the actual and random 
courts, on the theory that prior military experience might correlate with pro-government attitudes on na-
tional security issues.  I found, however, that a similar number (fifteen) of the random judges also were 
military veterans. 
44  See Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Gary Zuk, Clinton’s Judges:  Summing 
Up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228, 253 (Mar.–Apr. 2001). 
45  See id. 
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were Republican appointees.46  But the eleven appointments Rehnquist 
made since 1998 have been predominantly Democrat (six to five). 
This shift is marked enough to merit some speculation about its origin.  
One can imagine a number of different motivations behind the Chief Jus-
tice’s shift toward more even-handed appointment behavior in recent years.  
One could be that the Chief Justice held a more complex set of strategic 
goals than simple ideology maximization in choosing judges for the FISA 
Court.  Congressional willingness to grant the Chief Justice this appoint-
ment power, and indeed the breadth of federal judicial authority generally, 
rests in significant part on the proposition that what the judiciary does is 
somehow different than the stuff of ordinary politics.  The Chief Justice was 
instrumental in two episodes in recent years that have undermined the pub-
lic confidence that the judiciary is separate from ordinary politics.  First was 
the infamous Bush v. Gore decision.  Second, the Chief Justice made con-
troversial appointments—including David Sentelle—to the Special Division 
of the D.C. Circuit, which in turn authorized Kenneth Starr’s sweeping in-
vestigation of President Clinton.47  In the wake of such rancorous episodes, 
the Chief Justice may have modified his appointment behavior in an effort 
to rehabilitate his—and by proxy, the judiciary’s—reputation for evenhand-
edness. 
If this is so, it appears that the Chief Justice was able to accomplish 
this reputation-burnishing objective at little cost in terms of FISA Court 
outcomes.  This follows from two considerations, both of which may help 
explain his markedly increased willingness to select Democrat appointees in 
recent years.  The first is that by the late 1990s the Chief Justice had a size-
able pool of Clinton appointees from which to choose, and he may have 
perceived the Clinton judges as somewhat more conservative than the 
Carter cohort, particularly on law-and-order issues.48  More specifically, the 
Chief Justice may have successfully identified particular Clinton appointees 
whose approach to criminal law and procedure he favored, and avoided par-
ticular judges he disfavored. 
 
46  See infra app. 
47  See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 5 (describing the Starr–Sentelle appointments and noting the 
“great danger” that “a conservative Chief Justice . . . is perceived as likely to select conservative 
judges”); Daley, supra note 5 (debating the selection of Kenneth Starr due to Starr’s Republican affilia-
tion). 
48  See Robert A. Carp, Kenneth L. Manning, & Ronald Stidham, President Clinton’s District 
Judges:  “Extreme Liberals” or Just Plain Moderates?, 84 JUDICATURE 282, 285 & tbls. 1, 2 (2001) 
(finding that Carter district court appointees were generally more “liberal” in voting behavior than dis-
trict judges appointed by Clinton, and that the Carter district judges were more likely to rule for defen-
dants in criminal cases than Clinton appointees); see also C.K. Rowland, Donald Songer & Robert A. 
Carp, Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal Courts:  The Reagan Judges, 
22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 191, 198 (1988) (finding a “high level of support for criminal defendants” 
among Carter appointees). 
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Finally, because any FISA Court rulings denying government surveil-
lance requests are reviewed by a three-judge panel of appellate judges se-
lected by the Chief Justice, Rehnquist could have appointed a more diverse 
group of FISA district judges while protecting pro-government outcomes by 
selecting a more uniformly conservative group of judges for the FISA Court 
of Review.  There is some evidence the Chief Justice did in fact engage in 
this kind of nuanced strategic behavior.  The recent trend toward a more bi-
partisan FISA Court has not been matched by a similar pattern on the FISA 
Court of Review, which has been comprised of uniformly Republican ap-
pointees.  Rehnquist picked six judges for this review court, all of whom 
were Nixon or Reagan appointees.49  Further attitudinal research on the 
FISA appellate judges would help illuminate this possible explanation for 
the Chief Justice’s appointment behavior. 
B. Fourth Amendment Case Data 
As was the case for the general ideology scores, the FISA appointees’ 
behavior in Fourth Amendment cases does not appear to differ dramatically 
from that in the random group.  Table 2 illustrates that, taking all cases to-
gether, the Rehnquist appointees were only slightly more likely to rule for 
the government on Fourth Amendment issues.  Constructing a larger ran-
dom set, and coding the Fourth Amendment decisions of those judges, 
might lend greater significance to the small gap that exists, or might reveal 
a slightly larger divergence. 
 











FISA Judges (n=25)    327    285    87.16 %    11.914 
Random Judges (n=25)    216    187    82.87 %    26.037 
 
An interesting variance does exist, however in the standard deviation 
among the government win percentages for the judges within the two 
groups, suggesting the Chief Justice may have consciously avoided judges 
who were more likely to rule against the government in this type of case.  
The randomly selected group was ideologically heterogeneous—including 
some extremely pro-government judges but also some at the other end of 
the spectrum.  Such internal group variation (or lack thereof) is potentially 
important to the consistency of FISA Court outcomes, since the judges take 
 
49  See Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, supra note 6, at 401 (appendix 
listing judges). 
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turns sitting individually to hear surveillance warrant requests.50  The fact 
that the Rehnquist-selected cohort displays less dramatic variation is per-
haps suggestive of a strategic choice to avoid preference outliers, particu-
larly in a pro-defendant direction. 
It is also striking, if perhaps unsurprising, that I found significantly 
more Fourth Amendment decisions for the actual FISA judges than for the 
random control group.  This variance is not explained by more time on the 
federal bench; the random group was slightly senior to the appointed group.  
I speculate that the difference is attributable to two factors, productivity and 
self-promoting behavior, both of which might correlate with likelihood of 
special court appointment.  The greater number of decisions from the FISA 
judges obviously suggests greater productivity, and it is easy to speculate 
about how busier district judges might gain relatively more notoriety among 
judges at higher levels, including the Chief Justice.  There may also be an 
analogous variance in the eagerness of district judges to engage in affirma-
tive reputation-enhancing behavior—here, by sending their written rulings 
to West Publishing.51  To assess this volitional component I looked to the 
number of district court Fourth Amendment decisions available in the 
Westlaw database for each judge in both groups, and then averaged those 
figures.  Table 3 illustrates the differences between the two groups.   
Table 3: Average Number of District Court Fourth Amendment Opin-
ions, Per Judge. 
 District Court 4A 
Opinions 
District Court 4A 
Opinions, Excluding Single 
Most Productive Judge 
FISA Judges          5.4          4.9 
Random Judges          4.3          2.9 
 
The actual FISA group had a higher number of opinions in the aggre-
gate, but on this measure the random group’s basic average was heavily 
skewed by the inclusion of Gene Carter of Maine.  Judge Carter, who ap-
parently has taken on the Fourth Amendment as a personal specialty, had 35 
such opinions in the relevant database.  No other judge in either group ex-
ceeded 17.  To remove the skew caused by Judge Carter’s anomalous be-
havior, I averaged the number of opinions published by each group, 
excluding the data point from the single most frequently published judge in 
 
50  The judges rotate on a relatively fixed schedule, traveling to Washington, D.C., for brief stints to 
hear FISA cases, then returning to their regular judicial business. 
51  Publication of district court opinions occurs primarily because district judges choose to send par-
ticular opinions to West Publishing, although West selects some decisions for publication itself.  See 
Stephen L. Wasby, Publication (or Not) of Appellate Rulings:  An Evaluation of Guidelines, 2 SETON 
HALL CIRC. REV. 41, 64–65 (2005). 
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each.  On this measure the FISA judges demonstrated significantly more 
self-promoting behavior than the random set.  It is not surprising that such 
behavior might correlate with notoriety at the highest levels of the federal 
judiciary, which in turn could facilitate appointment to a special federal 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
I embarked on this empirical project with the hypothesis that Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist has selected FISA Court judges who are conservative ideo-
logically and who tend to favor government interests when assessing 
surveillance requests.  Nothing in these findings leads me to think other-
wise.  However, the study findings also suggest that the Rehnquist choices 
were not significantly more conservative than the baseline federal judiciary 
during the period he served as Chief Justice.  It appears that the Chief Jus-
tice’s choices generally reflected background attitudinal features present on 
the federal district bench at the time he made his selections.  This congru-
ence is not necessarily evidence of random selection by the Chief Justice.  It 
is probable that Chief Justice Rehnquist was aware of the ideological back-
ground rate of the federal district court judiciary, and possible that he stra-
tegically chose a group of judges that roughly approximated that 
conservative baseline.  The fact that the actual FISA judges’ Fourth 
Amendment behavior was more consistently pro-government than the indi-
vidual random judges (a group with much higher variance on this dimen-
sion) provides at least a hint of this kind of conscious selection.  Ultimately, 
we do not know on what grounds, or by what process, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist chose this particular group of judges to serve on the FISA Court.  
This inscrutability may provide an independent reason to object to this fea-
ture of the Chief’s authority.  In the face of this silence, we can speculate 
that William Rehnquist exercised his authority in this area with the same 
sophistication he brought to his management of the Supreme Court and the 
Article III judiciary more broadly, selecting a cohort of FISA judges that 
was generally but not uniformly conservative and that did not deviate sig-
nificantly from the overall federal district court bench. 
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Conrad K. Cyr  1987 D. Me. 1981 Reagan 
James E. Noland 1987 S. D. Ind. 1966 Johnson 
Joyce H. Green 1988 D.D.C. 1979 Carter 
Robert W. Warren 1989 E.D. Wis. 1974 Nixon 
Wendell A. Miles 1989 W.D. Mich. 1974 Nixon 
Frank Freedman 1990 D. Mass. 1972 Nixon 
Ralph G. Thompson 1990 W.D. Okla. 1975 Ford 
Charles Schwartz Jr. 1991 E.D. La. 1976 Ford 
Earl H. Carroll 1992 D. Ariz. 1980 Carter 
James C. Cacheris 1993 E.D. Va. 1983 Reagan 
John F. Keenan 1994 S.D.N.Y 1983 Reagan 
Royce C. Lamberth 1995 D.D.C. 1987 Reagan 
William Stafford 1996 N.D. Fla. 1975 Ford 
Stanley S. Brotman 1997 D.N.J. 1975 Ford 
Harold A. Baker 1998 C.D. Ill. 1978 Carter 
Michael J. Davis 1999 D. Minn. 1994 Clinton 
John Edward Conway 2000 D.N.M. 1986 Reagan 
Claude M. Hilton 2000 E.D. Va. 1985 Reagan 
James G. Carr 2001 N.D. Ohio 1994 Clinton 
Nathaniel M. Gorton 2001 D. Mass. 1992 Bush 
James Robertson 2002 D.D.C. 1994 Clinton 
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly 2002 D.D.C. 1997 Clinton 
Robert Broomfield 2003 D. Ariz. 1985 Reagan 
George Kazen 2003 S.D. Tex. 1979 Carter 
Dee Benson 2004 D. Utah 1991 Bush 
 
52  Historical data on the FISA Court appointments assessed here are not compiled in any one offi-
cial or secondary source, and apparently (based on telephone and email requests by the author) are not 
kept in comprehensive form by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, or 
the Justice Department’s FISA Court clerk.  Accordingly, the information in this Appendix was com-
piled through detailed chronological review of several sources:  (1) The Third Branch, an official peri-
odical of the federal judiciary, which occasionally listed individual FISA Court appointments when 
made; (2) the current FISA Court page on the Department of Justice website, which for recent years has 
listed the judges; (3) the Federal Judicial Center’s judicial biography database, found at http://
www.fjc.gov; (4) the judicial biographical information available in electronic editions of the West Legal 
Directory and the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary; and (5) individual media reports found in search-
able electronic databases recounting relevant appointments. 
